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Abstract—Motivated by the need of assessing the optimal
allocation of battery energy storage services across various
markets and the corresponding impact on market operations, an
optimization framework is proposed in this work to coordinate
the operation of an independent utility-scale price-maker battery
energy storage system (BESS) in the energy, spinning reserve and
performance-based regulation markets. The entire problem is
formulated as a bi-level optimization process, where the structure
of all markets is modeled considering the joint operation limits.
The strategic bidding behavior of a price-maker BESS in a pay
as performance regulation market is investigated. Additionally,
a specific approach is introduced for modeling automatic gen-
eration control (AGC) signals in the optimization. Although the
formulated problem is non-linear, it is converted to mixed-integer
linear programming (MILP) to find the optimum solution. The
proposed framework is evaluated using test case scenarios created
from real-world market data. Case study results show the impact
of BESS’s price-making behavior on the joint operation of energy,
reserve, and regulation markets.
Index Terms—Battery energy storage system (BESS), bidding
strategy, price-maker, performance-based regulation market, bi-
level optimization, mixed integer linear programming
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, US power systems saw a growing integra-
tion of utility-scale battery energy storage systems (BESSs).
With the capability of providing both energy arbitrage and
fast ramping services, BESSs offer promising solutions to
improve system flexibility and address renewable intermittency
and uncertainty [1]. BESSs’ capability of multiple service
provision is recognized in the smart grid roadmap of National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [2]. To further
encourage BESS integration, US Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) issued a series of orders (784, 755, and
841), allowing BESSs to participate in various markets [3]–[5].
The growing BESS integration has inspired researchers to
evaluate the impact of BESS resources on system operation
and address potential problems caused by BESS integration.
Among existing research directions, optimal scheduling of
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merchant BESSs and the impact of BESSs’ profit maximiza-
tion activities on market operations are of great interest to
power system society, especially when the BESS is large
enough to perform as a price-maker. The work presented in
this paper falls within this research direction.
Existing literature along the above research direction falls
into two categories. The first category models BESS as a price-
taker in various markets [6]–[11]. An optimization framework
for coordinating the participation of price-taker BESS in day-
ahead (DA) an real-time (RT) energy markets is proposed in
[6]. Reference [7] solves the profit maximization problem for
a BESS that participates in energy, reserve, and performance-
based regulation markets. Optimal charging/discharging sched-
ule based on the battery’s aging cost is achieved through an
online optimal control algorithm for the operation of a BESS
in regulation only [8] or regulation and energy markets [9].
Uncertainty in market price prediction and amount of energy
deployment for the BESS strategic biding problem are handled
by robust optimization approach in [10], and this work is
expanded by adding aging cost to it in [11].
This paper falls into the second category of existing liter-
ature, where the BESS is modeled as a price-maker due to
its size and specific operation capabilities [12]–[15]. These
papers not only solve the bidding strategy problem but also
propose a framework for analyzing the impact of utility-scale
BESS on various electricity markets. This impact is crucial
for investigating the current expansion of utility-scale BESSs.
Performance of various market mechanisms in existence of a
utility-scale BESS is evaluated in [12]. Coordination problem
of a price-maker BESS in the DA energy market is addressed
in [13]. Although this work does not model ancillary services
markets that are usually more appealing for a BESS, it per-
forms a comprehensive analysis on the markets’ outcome and
storage profit in different conditions. Participation of BESS
as a price-maker entity in DA energy and reserve markets
along with RT balancing market is discussed in [14] and
[15]. Considering DA reserve and RT balancing markets in
these papers makes their analysis more accurate and closer
the actual opportunities that price-maker BESSs can have.
However, these papers do not model the frequency regulation978-1-7281-0407-2/19/$31.00 c©2019 IEEE
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market, therefore ignore BESSs’ profit for regulation service
provision. As an increasing number of BESSs are motivated
by FERC order 755 for participating in the regulation markets,
this exclusion may lead to inaccurate assessment on BESSs’
stacked services and total profit.
In this paper, an optimization framework is proposed to
coordinate the operation of a utility-scale price-maker BESS
in the energy, spinning reserve, and regulation markets. The
main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• The bidding and operation problem for a price-maker
BESS in energy, spinning reserve, and performance-based
regulation markets is formulated as a bi-level optimiza-
tion problem while considering operational details of
BESS and structural elements of each market.
• BESSs’s fast ramping capability and accurate regulation
signal tracking ability enable them to not only gain more
profit from the pay as performance regulation markets
but also become price makers and impact the market
outcomes. Thus, it is crucial to consider the participation
of price-maker BESS in the performance-based regulation
market. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has
not been addressed before.
• Deployment of automatic generation control (AGC) sig-
nals in a bi-level problem and coordination between en-
ergy, reserve and regulation markets are handled through
a particular choice of market clearing intervals.
• A realistic procedure for generating synthetic price bids
and load data based on real-world market data is proposed
in this work. Case studies for analyzing the operation
scheduling of BESS and the impact of BESS scheduling
on various markets are performed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the market structures adopted in this paper and
proposes the price-maker BESS profit maximization model.
Simulation procedure and different case study results along
with the discussions on them are presented in section III.
Finally, section IV draws conclusions and presents future
research directions.
II. METHODOLOGY AND FORMULATION
Since price-maker BESSs can impact market clearing out-
comes, the strategic biding problem of BESSs is formulated
as a bi-level optimization problem. In the upper-level (UL)
problem, the BESS owner maximizes the revenue from par-
ticipating in energy, spinning reserve, and regulation markets
while considering its operating limits. The market clearing
prices (MCPs) and scheduled power inputs/outputs of BESS in
each market are obtained from the lower-level (LL) problem.
The LL problem represents the joint optimization of energy,
reserve, and regulation markets. This LL problem simulates
the RT joint market clearing process of the independent system
operators (ISOs). Note that in the strategic biding problem of
a price-taker BESS, LL problem does not need to be modeled
as BESS cannot affect markets, and prices are parameters for
its profit maximization problem. Formulations of the UL and
LL problems are presented in detail in separate subsections
after depicting an overview of the joint market modeling.
A. The Market Structures
This section describes the market structures for the RT
energy, spinning reserve, and regulation markets that are
modeled in the proposed framework.
The RT energy market is modeled using a simplified
approach. This model allows BESSs to submit supply or
demand bids in order to gain profit from arbitraging energy
between different time intervals or various markets. Other
market participants (such as conventional generators) submit
supply bids to the RT energy market to fulfill system net
demand in each time interval.
The RT spinning reserve market is an upward-only reserve
market. Although it is not usual to consider a downward
reserve market, it is similar to the upward reserve and can
be handled by the proposed framework through minor ad-
justments. Market participants (including BESSs) are compen-
sated by the MCP for their reserved capacities. Deployment
of spinning reserve product is not modeled in this paper since
the reserve deployment is called in the contingency situations,
which falls out of the scope of this work.
The RT pay as performance frequency regulation market
modeled in this paper consists of payment components for
both regulation capacity and regulation mileage. Capacity
price is paid to regulating units for reserving each MW
of their generation capability in order to enable regulation
service provision. Mileage price is paid for each MW of
deployed regulation service (for both up-regulation and down-
regulation). The payment component for regulation mileage is
affected by the units’ accuracy in following AGC signals. The
regulation market model used in this work is based on [16]. It
is assumed that the BESS can perfectly follow AGC signals.
In regulation market operations, AGC signals are contin-
uously sent to regulation market participants in short time
intervals (every four seconds). Meanwhile, the amount of
awarded regulation capacity and mileage for each market
participant within each time interval affects the dispatch of
AGC signals. Therefore, it is not trivial to model AGC signals
in a bi-level optimization framework. In order to handle this
issue, this paper assumes the AGC signals to have similar
features as the RegD signals in the regulation market of PJM
Interconnection. In this way, the average of the AGC signal
is zero in each 15-minute time interval [17]. Using this AGC
signal model, when the regulation market is cleared every 15
minutes, BESS’s energy level at the beginning and end of
the 15-minute interval remain unchanged, if the BESS only
participates in the regulation market.
This paper assumes all the three markets are cleared every
15 minutes to coordinate BESSs’ resource allocation across
RT energy, reserve, and regulation markets. Although this
assumption increases computational efforts for solving the bi-
level optimization problem, it offers two advantages. First,
it enables us to model AGC signals in the biding problem.
Second, clearing RT markets in sub-hour intervals is closer to
the ISOs’ practical operation routine.
B. Formulation of The Upper-Level Problem
In the UL problem, the BESS owner maximizes the revenue
from participating in multiple markets. The UL problem is
formulated as follows:
max
∑
t∈T
[
piEt (P
BS
t − PBDt ) + piRst PBRst + piRg,Ct PBRg,Ct
+ piRg,Mt P
BRg,M
t
]
∆t (U1)
subject to:
0 ≤ Sbidt ≤ utPRate; ∀t ∈ T (U2)
0 ≤ Dbidt ≤ (1− ut)PRate; ∀t ∈ T (U3)
0 ≤ Rsbidt ≤ PRate; ∀t ∈ T (U4)
0 ≤ Rgbidt ≤ PRate; ∀t ∈ T (U5)
PBDt − PBSt − PBRst ≥ −PRate + PBRg,Ct ; ∀t ∈ T (U6)
PBDt − PBSt − PBRst ≤ PRate − PBRg,Ct ; ∀t ∈ T (U7)
SOCt = SOC
Init +
t∑
k=1
(PBDk − PBSk )∆t; ∀t ∈ T (U8)
SOCt ≥ SOCMin + (PBRg,Ct + PBRst )∆t; ∀t ∈ T (U9)
SOCt ≤ SOCMax − PBRg,Ct ∆t; ∀t ∈ T (U10)
ut ∈ {0, 1}; ∀t ∈ T (U11)
In the above formulation, t denotes the index of market
clearing intervals; T denotes the timespan of the entire op-
timization; ∆t denotes the timespan of each market clearing
interval; PBSt and P
BD
t denote scheduled BESS power supply
and demand in RT energy market at interval t, respectively;
PBRst denotes BESS reserve capacity at interval t; P
BRg,C
t
and PBRg,Mt denote BESS regulation capacity and regulation
mileage at interval t, respectively; piEt , pi
Rs
t , pi
Rg,C
t , and
piRg,Mt denote the prices for BESS energy arbitrage, reserve
capacity, regulation capacity, and regulation mileage at interval
t, respectively; Sbidt and D
Bid
t denote BESS supply and
demand quantity bids to the RT energy market at interval t,
respectively; Rsbidt and Rg
bid
t denote BESS reserve and regu-
lation quantity bids at interval t, respectively; PRate denotes
BESS charging/discharging rate; SOCt denotes BESS state of
charge (SOC) at interval t; SOCMin and SOCMax denote
BESS minimum and maximum charge levels, respectively;
SOCInit denotes BESS initial charge level; ut is the BESS
charge/discharge indicator. ut = 0 or ut = 1 indicates the
BESS is charged or discharged during interval t, respectively.
In the UL problem, the objective function (U1) determines
BESS’s total revenue by providing different services. The
constraints (U2 through U11) describes the following oper-
ating limits for BESS: 1) BESS’s individual bids and total
charging/discharging power at each market clearing interval
lie within the charging/discharging rate of BESS; 2) For each
interval, BESS is allowed to submit either a supply bid or
a demand bid to the RT energy market; 3) BESS’s SOC
is updated at each interval based on the initial SOC and
BESS’s bids for energy arbitrage; 4) At each time interval,
BESS’s SOC lies within its upper/lower limits subtracted
by the total power reserved for ancillary service provision.
In practice, batteries have SOC limitations so that they will
not be charged to the maximum capacity and discharged to
zero. These constraints, along with batteries’ charge/discharge
efficiency, are neglected in this work for simplicity.
C. Formulation of The Lower-Level Problem
The LL problem describes the joint market clearing process
for ISO’s RT energy, reserve, and regulation markets. This LL
problem is formulated as follows:
min
∑
t∈T
([∑
j∈G
(
αSj,tP
GS
j,t + α
Rs
j,tP
GRs
j,t + α
Rg,C
j,t P
GRg,C
j,t +
αRg,Mj,t P
GRg,M
j,t
)]
+
[
βSt P
BS
t − βDt PBDt + βRst PBRst
+ βRg,Ct P
BRg,C
t + β
Rg,M
t P
BRg,M
t
])
∆t (L1)
subject to:
PGSj,t − PGRg,Cj,t ≥ PMinj ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ G (L2)
PGSj,t + P
GRs
j,t + P
GRg,C
j,t ≤ PMaxj ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ G (L3)
0 ≤ PGRsj,t ≤ PRs,ramp; ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ G (L4)
0 ≤ PGRg,Cj,t ≤ PRg,ramp; ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ G (L5)
PGRg,Mj,t ≥ PGRg,Cj,t ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ G (L6)
PGRg,Mj,t ≤ mGRgj PGRg,Cj,t ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ G (L7)
0 ≤ PBSt ≤ Sbidt ; ∀t ∈ T (L8)
0 ≤ PBDt ≤ Dbidt ; ∀t ∈ T (L9)
0 ≤ PBRst ≤ Rsbidt ; ∀t ∈ T (L10)
0 ≤ PBRg,Ct ≤ Rgbidt ; ∀t ∈ T (L11)
PBRg,Mt ≥ PBRg,Ct ; ∀t ∈ T (L12)
PBRg,Mt ≤ mBRgPBRg,Ct ; ∀t ∈ T (L13)∑
j∈G
PGRsj,t + P
BRs
t ≥ QRst ; ∀t ∈ T : piRst (L14)∑
j∈G
PGRg,Cj,t + P
BRg,C
t ≥ QRg,Ct ; ∀t ∈ T : piRg,Ct (L15)∑
j∈G
PGRg,Mj,t + P
BRg,M
t ≥ QRg,Mt ; ∀t ∈ T : piRg,Mt (L16)∑
j∈G
PGSj,t + P
BS
t − PBDt = PLoadt ; ∀t ∈ T : piEt (L17)
In the above formulation, G denotes the set of regular
generating units (other than BESS); αSj,t, α
Rs
j,t , α
Rg,C
j,t , and
αRg,Mj,t denote the energy, reserve, regulation capacity, and
regulation mileage price bids for jth generating unit at interval
t, respectively; PGSj,t , P
GRs
j,t , P
GRg,C
j,t , and P
GRg,M
j,t denote
the scheduled power of jth generating unit at interval t, for
energy, reserve, regulation capacity, and regulation mileage
provision, respectively; βSt , β
D
t , β
Rs
t , β
Rg,C
t , and β
Rg,M
t
denote BESS’s price bids for energy supply, energy demand,
reserve, regulation capacity and regulation mileage provision
at interval t, respectively; PMinj and P
Max
j denote the mini-
mum and maximum output of jth generating unit, respectively;
PRs,ramp and PRg,ramp denote the reserve and regulation
ramp rates of the generating unit, respectively; QRst , Q
Rg,C
t
and QRg,Mt denote the amount of system reserve, regulation
capacity and regulation mileage requirements at interval t,
respectively; PLoadt denotes system total load at interval t;
mGRgj and m
BRg denote regulation mileage multipliers of jth
generating unit and the BESS, respectively. These multipliers
are calculated by ISOs based on the market participants’
historical performance on regulation service provision.
In the LL problem, the objective function (L1) determines
the total operating cost of the system considering energy,
reserve, and regulation market operations. The constraints (L2
through L17) describes the following operating limits for ISO
markets: 1) For each generating unit, its total power delivery
at each time interval lies within its maximum and minimum
generation limits; 2) For each generating unit, its reserve
and regulation capacity provision at each time interval does
not exceed the corresponding ramp rates; 3) Each regulation
market participant (including the BESS and generating units)
satisfies the regulation market requirements defined in (L6),
(L7), (L12) and (L13); 3) The scheduled power of BESS in
different markets is limited by the corresponding power bids;
4) System requirements for reserve, regulation capacity, and
regulation mileage provision are satisfied when the markets are
cleared at each time interval; 5) The system total load needs
to be served at each time interval. For simplicity, the above
LL problem does not model the transmission system.
D. Solution Procedure
The proposed bi-level optimization is a nonlinear and non-
convex problem. For solving this problem, it is converted to
a MILP problem. Details of this conversion process can be
found in [18].
III. CASE STUDIES
In this section, numerical studies are performed to evaluate
the performance of the proposed framework, investigate the
behavior of a price-maker BESS across multiple markets, and
study the BESS’s impact on various markets.
A. The Test System
The test system contains five generators and one utility-
scale BESS. Numerical studies are performed over a 24-hour
horizon consisting of 96 market clearing intervals. The length
of each market clearing interval is 15 minutes. Table I shows
the generators’ parameters. The BESS has an energy capacity
of 400 MWh and a charging/discharging rate of 40 MW.
The numerical case studies require input data for the system
total loads and the price bids of all the other units. In this
paper, these inputs are created based on the historical price
and load data from PJM Interconnection [19]. Fig. 1 shows the
normalized price and load patterns over the 24-hour horizon
(extracted from PJM 2018 data).
TABLE I
GENERATOR INFORMATION
Generator Base Price Bid PMax PRs,ramp PRg,ramp
Number ($/MWh) (MW) (MW) (MW)
1 10 400 80 40
2 14 300 60 30
3 15 210 42 21
4 30 350 70 35
5 40 270 54 27
Fig. 1. Normalized price and load patterns used in the case studies.
Total system demand of 1000 MW is mapped on the load
pattern for creating the system load in each time interval of
simulations. It means that, according to Fig. 1, system load is
1000 MW in the 73th interval and is less than that in other
intervals. System’s spinning reserve and regulation capacity
requirement are considered to be 10% and 4% of load in each
interval. Regulation mileage requirement is assumed to be 1.75
times the regulation capacity requirement in each interval.
The base price bid of each generator, which is given in
Table 1 is also mapped on the extracted price pattern to
create each generator’s energy price bid for each time interval.
Additionally, in 2018 PJM data, average ratios of reserve price,
regulation capacity price, and regulation mileage price to the
energy price are respectively 0.15, 0.4, and 0.07. Therefore,
generators’ energy price bid in each time interval is multiplied
by 0.15, 0.4 and 0.07 to respectively create their price bids
for providing the reserve, regulation capacity, and regulation
mileage. Note that the mileage multipliers of generators and
BESS are assumed large enough to not to limit their outputs.
B. Case Study Results
The proposed approach is tested in four different cases that
represent various market participation policies for the BESS.
In Case 1, only the energy market is modeled, and BESS
performs energy arbitrage between different hours. Fig. 2
presents the revenue values and SOC of the BESS across
the 24-hour horizon. It is shown in Fig. 2 that the BESS
charges during off-peak hours when the energy price is low
and discharges during peak hours when the energy price is
high. Negative revenue from the energy market indicates the
BESS’s energy purchasing activities through the RT energy
market. It can be seen that in the last intervals, price changes
in a way that it is profitable for BESS to buy and then sell
Fig. 2. Simulation result of Case 1. SOC indicates the state of charge of the
BESS at each interval; E indicates BESS revenue from the energy market.
Fig. 3. Simulation result of Case 2. SOC indicates the state of charge of the
BESS at each interval; E indicates BESS revenue from the energy market; Rs
indicates BESS revenue from the spinning reserve market.
energy to the market, which also causes changes in SOC. Note
that ancillary service markets are not considered in this case.
In Case 2, energy and spinning reserve markets are modeled.
Fig. 3 presents BESS’s 24-hour revenue and SOC for this
case. According to Fig. 3, when the BESS participates in both
energy and reserve markets, it first charges itself during the
off-peak hours at the beginning of the day, when the energy
price is low. During the peak hours with high energy prices,
the BESS allocates its available energy optimally across both
energy and reserve markets. It is observed that during the
charging period, BESS has negative revenue from the energy
market and positive revenue from the reserve market, when its
SOC increases with a constant rate. It means that the BESS
simultaneously purchases energy from the energy market and
sells all or part of its purchased energy to the reserve market.
This represents the BESS’s arbitrage activities between these
two markets at the same market clearing interval. This arbi-
trage between energy and reserve markets could not happen
during the discharging period (when the SOC decreases), due
to the BESS operating constraints (U6 and U7) defined in the
UL problem. In other words, constraints U6 and U7 indicate
that 1) during charging periods, BESS could provide reserve
service by reducing the amount of real power it purchases from
the real-time energy market; 2) during discharging periods,
BESS could not perform the above activity, since it acts as a
seller (instead of a buyer) in the real-time energy market and
it needs extra capacity for reserve service provision.
Fig. 4. Simulation result of Case 3. SOC indicates the state of charge of the
BESS at each interval; E indicates BESS’s revenue from the energy market;
Rg,C indicates BESS’s revenue from regulation capacity provision; Rg,M
indicates BESS’s revenue from regulation mileage provision; Rg indicates
BESS’s total revenue from the regulation market (considering both regulation
capacity and mileage provision).
In Case 3, energy and regulation markets are modeled. Fig. 4
shows BESS’s 24-hour revenue and SOC under this scenario.
According to Fig. 4, during the charging period (when the
SOC increases), the BESS does not perform arbitrage activities
between the energy and regulation markets at the same market
clearing interval. This is caused by the fact that in order to
participate in the regulation market, the BESS’s SOC needs to
first reach a sufficient level for providing regulation services
in both directions. These operating constraints (U6 and U7)
are defined in the UL problem. To meet these constraints,
during the off-peak hours, the BESS first charges itself to
reach a profitable SOC level. After the initial charging period,
the BESS allocates its available energy to participate in both
energy and regulation markets. Comparison of Fig. 4 and
Fig. 3 shows that when the BESS participates in both energy
and regulation markets, its revenue from the energy market
during the peak hours is lower compared to Case 2. On the
other hand, in Case 3, similar to Case 2, the maximum SOC
reached by the BESS across simulation horizon is reduced
compared to Case 1. This indicates that BESS could avoid
deep charging/discharging cycles by participating in ancillary
services markets, which can reduce batteries’ degradation cost.
In Case 4, all of the energy, reserve, and regulation markets
are modeled together. Fig. 5 shows BESS’s 24-hour revenue
and SOC under this scenario. It is shown in Fig. 5 that the
BESS obtains the least amount of revenue from the reserve
market. The BESS only performs limited arbitrage activities
between the energy and reserve markets at the charging period.
During the discharging period, the BESS do not participate
in the reserve market for most of the time. Additionally,
by comparing BESS’s revenue patterns around the 45th time
interval between Case 3 and Case 4, one could observe that:
1) in both cases, the BESS does not gain revenue from the
reserve market; 2) BESS’s revenue from energy and regulation
markets in Case 4 is significantly different from that in Case
3. This indicates the BESS could affect market outcomes in
multiple ways once it has the option of participating in all the
energy and ancillary services markets.
Fig. 5. Simulation result of Case 4. SOC indicates the state of charge of the
BESS at each interval; E indicates BESS’s revenue from the energy market;
Rs indicates BESS revenue from the spinning reserve market; Rg,C indicates
BESS’s revenue from regulation capacity provision; Rg,M indicates BESS’s
revenue from regulation mileage provision; Rg indicates BESS’s total revenue
from the regulation market (considering both regulation capacity and mileage
provision).
Fig. 6. BESS profit in various cases. E indicate BESS’s revenue from the
energy market; Rs indicate BESS’s revenue from the spinning reserve market;
Rg,C indicate BESS’s revenue from regulation capacity provision; Rg,M
indicate BESS’s revenue from regulation mileage provision.
Fig. 6 shows BESS’s total revenue from various markets for
Case 1 through Case 4. Fig. 6 indicates: 1) the BESS tends to
participate more in the regulation market and obtain most of
its revenue from it; 2) the BESS could gain more profit once it
is allowed to participate in more markets. These observations
agree with the BESS operating patterns in real-world practices
[20]. Besides, by comparing BESS’s revenue from the energy
market in Case 3 and Case 4, it is observed that the BESS
could obtain more revenue from the energy market if it is
allowed to participate in the reserve market.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a bi-level optimization framework to
study the strategic bidding problem of a price-maker BESS
across energy, spinning reserve, and pay as performance
regulation markets. A proper approach is applied to model
the AGC signals in this bi-level framework. A realistic way
of generating synthetic test case data is applied to map the
historical price and load patterns in PJM Interconnection to
the studied test system. Case study results show the impact of
a price-maker BESS on the joint market clearing process.
Built upon this work, future research could focus on con-
sidering the BESS degradation cost and refining the AGC
signal modeling in the proposed bi-level framework, as well
as studying the impact of the transmission network on the
operations of BESS-integrated wholesale electricity markets.
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